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High income risk is part of life in developing countries. Climatic risks, economic fluctuations, but also a
large number of individual-specific shocks make these households vulnerable to serious hardship. For
example, details are given on the various shocks and events causing serious hardship to rural households
in Ethiopia in the last twenty years. Not surprisingly for Ethiopia, climatic events are the most common
cause of shocks, but many households suffer from other common or idiosyncratic shocks related to
economic policy, labour or livestock.
Rural and urban households in developing countries face substantial risk. Households in risky
environments have developed sophisticated (ex ante) risk-management and (ex post) risk-coping
strategies, including self-insurance via savings and informal insurance mechanisms while formal credit
and insurance markets appear to contribute only little to reducing income risk and its consequences.
Despite these strategies, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high. In this paper, I focus on the
opportunities available to households to use risk-management and risk-coping strategies, and on the
constraints on their effectiveness, by reviewing some of the recent literature on savings as insurance,
income diversification and smoothing, and informal risk-sharing arrangements. Risk and lumpiness limit
the opportunities to use assets as insurance. Entry constraints limit the usefulness of income
diversification. Informal risk-sharing only provides limited protection, especially for some of the poor and
their sustainability during periods of change is in doubt. Public safety nets are likely to be beneficial, but
their impact is at times limited while they may have negative externalities on households not covered by
the safety net. The paper also discusses the implications for policy as well as the information
requirements to increase our understanding of vulnerability and implement better vulnerability reducing
policies.
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Introduction
Many other studies have reported high income variability related to risks of various
forms. Using the 10-year panel data for one of three ICRISAT villages in India,
Townsend (1994) reports high yearly yield fluctuations (in monetary terms) per unit of
land for the dominant crops. Kinsey et al. (1998) report a high frequency of harvest
failures in a 23-year panel of rural households in a resettlement area in Zimbabwe. Bliss
and Stern (1982) provide an estimate for Palanpur, India: if the onset of production is
delayed by two weeks, then yields decline by 20 per cent. Morduch (1995) provides
many more other examples.
This paper reviews the strategies households and individuals use to avoid consumption
shortfalls caused by risk. It draws on a growing empirical economic literature, mainly
based on panel data studies, supplemented by my own work on Ethiopia. This is not the
first survey on this topic – other examples are Alderman and Paxson (1994), Morduch
(1995, 1999), Townsend (1995) and Fafchamps (1999). My focus is different from these
studies as I attempt to focus on the constraints faced by households to use these
strategies as well as on policies to strengthen the ability of communities, households and
individuals to avoid serious consumption shortfalls due to risk. Most examples quoted
in this paper are from Africa and Asia. Lustig (2001) contains relevant examples from
Latin America. In the next section, I introduce the risk problem faced by households. In
Section 2, I focus on asset strategies, while Section 3 reviews income-based strategies.
Section 4 discusses informal and formal safety nets. Section 5 briefly reviews ways of
defining and monitoring vulnerability to poverty.
Table 1
Risk-related hardship faced by rural households in Ethiopia
Events causing of hardship Percentage of households
reported to have been
seriously affected in last 20
years
Harvest failure (drought, flooding, frost, etc.) 78
Policy shock (taxation, forced labour, ban on
migration, …)
42
Labour problems (illness or deaths) 40
Oxen problems (diseases, deaths) 39
Other livestock (diseases, deaths) 35
Land problems (villagization, land reform) 17
Assets losses (fire, loss) 16
War 7
Crime/banditry (theft, violence) 3
Source: Own calculations based on Ethiopian Rural Panel Data Survey (1994–1997).2
1 Risk, household responses and consequences
Shocks can be idiosyncratic or common. Other characteristics matter as well in causing
hardship or exacerbating the effect of shocks to income. The nature of the shock has
implications for the ability to cope with its consequences. Income Frisk is caused by a
variety of factors. Typically, common (aggregate, economy-wide, covariate) risk is
distinguished from individual (idiosyncratic) risk: the former affects everybody in a
particular community or region; the latter only affects a particular individual in this
community. In practice, even within well-defined rural communities, few risks are
purely idiosyncratic or common. Table 2 gives details on different events and shocks
experienced by households in a three-period panel data set on Ethiopia in a data set. A
large number of different shocks affecting income happen; most shocks have both
idiosyncratic and common parts. (In the last two columns, the table gives measures of
the extent to which the shock is ‘common’ to the households in the community. The
lower the contribution of the village level variance to total variance, the more
idiosyncratic the shock. The higher the F-statistic, the higher the contribution of village
level shocks to total shocks.)
Other studies also find that the idiosyncratic part of income risk is relatively large.
Deaton (1997) finds that common components for particular villages explain very little
of the variation of household income changes within villages in the Côte d’Ivoire LSMS
data for 1985–86. Townsend (1995) reports evidence from a Thai household data set,
suggesting that there are few common regional components in income growth. The
Indian ICRISAT-data suggest also relatively limited co-movement in incomes within the
villages (Townsend 1995). Morduch (2001) suggests that idiosyncratic risk (inclusive of
measurement error) accounts for 75 to 96 per cent of the total variance in income in
these villages. Udry (1991) reports similar magnitudes for Northern Nigeria.
Other characteristics of income risk include the frequency and intensity of shocks, and
the persistence of their impact (see also Morduch 1999). Relatively small but frequent
shocks are more easily to deal with than large, infrequent negative shocks. Examples of
the latter are disability or chronic illness; the former are events such as transient illness.
Gertler and Gruber (1997) find that, in terms of consumption levels, households in their
sample from Indonesia can only protect 30 per cent of the low-frequency health shocks
with serious long term effects, but about 70 per cent of the high-frequency smaller
health shocks. If there is some persistence in the effects of a shock, i.e. bad shocks have
long-term consequences, then coping is more difficult. Theoretically, the effects of
autocorrelation in income on buffer stock behaviour are explored by Deaton (1991).
Using panel data from Pakistan, Alderman (1998) finds that with successive shocks,
consumption smoothing is more difficult than with single shocks. Some shocks may
have persistent effects: for example, health problems tend to have consequences that
last.3
Table 2
Shocks affecting income 1994–1995 (n=1450, 15 communities)










Village rainfall (% above long-run mean) 0.06 0.12 0.12 100
Rain index (individual, 1 is best)
$ 0.57 0.57 0.63 40.6 64.6
Non-rain shock index (1 is best), total
index
$
0.65 n.a. 0.80 28.2 37.2
Non-rain shock: low temperature, frost,
storm, etc.
$
0.71 n.a. 0.82 34.4 49.9
Non-rain shock: pests and diseases on
crops
$
0.59 n.a. 0.77 28.9 38.7
Non-rain shock: animal damage,
trampling,…
$
0.68 n.a. 0.85 30.9 42.6
Non-rain shock: weed damage
$ 0.29 n.a. 0.14 13.8 15.3
Crop index (best=1, 0 worst)
$ 0.33 0.65 0.43 34.0 49.1
Livestock affected by animal disease
(1 is best)
$
0.72 0.86 0.89 24.6 30.6
Livestock affected by lack of water and
grazing land (1 is best)
$
0.71 0.78 0.78 31.7 25.3
Number of days lost by adults in last
month per adult
0.66 0.45 0.39 5.2 5.3
Adults died in last six months n.a. 0.04 0.02 5.6 5.8
Lower harvest linked to not having
labour due to illness
0.19 n.a. 0.13 15.9 17.8
Lower harvest due to not finding labour
when needed
0.18 n.a. 0.13 14.4 15.7
Lower harvest due to not finding oxen at
right time
0.40 n.a. 0.27 32.0 43.5
$ Index based on reported problems. 1 means no problems reported. 0 means all possible problems
occur. Rain index (individual) is based on problems for own activities from rainfall, including whether it
rained during harvest, irregularly for own crops, etc. Crop index is based on reported moderate or
serious crop failures.
* The results on the variance-decomposition are obtained allowing for time-varying village level means
on the pooled data set across rounds. In practice, this village-level variance is the R
2 of a regression
on a full set of time-varying village level dummies.
** The F-statistic of the analysis of variance associated with the importance of village level shocks. Note
that all tests suggest significant village-level effects at 5 per cent. The higher the F, the higher the
significance of the effects.
n.a. not available
Source: Dercon and Krishnan (2000a).4
The nature of the shock is important to understand the possibilities to deal with its
consequences. Idiosyncratic shocks can be insured within a community, but common
shocks can not: if everybody is affected, the risk cannot be shared. Formal or informal
insurance transfers (credit or insurance) from outside the community are necessary;
intertemporal transfers (e.g. depletion of individual or community-level savings) are
also possible.
Households do not just undergo the consequences of high risk. Households in risky
environments have developed sophisticated strategies to reduce the impact of shocks.
Alderman and Paxson (1994) distinguish risk-management from risk-coping strategies.1
The former attempt to affect ex ante the riskiness of the income process (‘income
smoothing’). Examples are income diversification, through combining activities with
low positive covariance and income-skewing, i.e. taking up low risk activities even at
the cost of low return. In practice, this implies that households are usually involved in a
variety of activities, including farm and off-farm activities, use seasonal migration to
diversify, etc. or focus on low risk activities even at the cost of a low return. In
Section 3, this is discussed further.
Risk-coping strategies involve self-insurance (through precautionary savings) and
informal group-based risk-sharing. They deal with the consequences (ex post)o fi n c o m e
risk (‘consumption smoothing’). Households can insure themselves by building up
assets in ‘good’ years to deplete these stocks in ‘bad’ years. This is the focus of
Section 2. Alternatively, informal arrangements can develop between members of a
group or village to support each other in case of hardship. These mechanisms are often
observed operating within extended families, ethnic groups, neighbourhood groups and
professional networks. In recent years, these mechanisms have been studied
theoretically and empirically in variety of settings (see also Section 4).
Risk-coping strategies may also involve attempting to earn extra income when hardship
occurs. Kochar (1995) reports increased labour supply as the key response in the
ICRISAT villages. The literature on coping strategies when famine strikes also regularly
report attempts to earn additional income through a reallocation of labour, including
temporary migration, earning income from collecting wild foods (also for own
consumption), gathering activities (such as increased firewood collection), etc. During
famines in Ethiopia or Sudan, these responses were all observed. Other examples are in
Corbett (1988)2 (for more details, see Section 3).
1 The World Development Report 2000/01 uses an alternative classification of strategies, taking the
response to risk as its focus. It distinguishes risk reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping strategies.
The classification used in this paper follows the economics literature and focuses on welfare
outcomes, such as consumption and other dimensions, and distinguishes risk strategies on the basis of
whether they take income as given or not (World Bank 2000).
2 The social sciences literature on household strategies dealing with shocks often uses a different
terminology. For example, Davies (1996) uses ‘coping strategies’ to describe strategies employed
during crises, where coping suggests success in dealing with the crisis, while ‘adaption’ is a
characteristic of a ‘vulnerable’ household, using ‘coping’ strategies as part of standard behaviour.
Adaptive strategies are then defined as a permanent change in the mix of ways in which households
make a living, irrespective of the year in question. For a good review, see Moser (1998). In this paper,
we consider a framework in which households develop strategies to deal with contingencies. A
distinction between adaption and coping seems less relevant. Any coping strategies will need ex-ante
actions, such as forming informal networks, or building up savings. Consequently, all households will5
Group-based insurance mechanisms are geared towards insuring idiosyncratic shocks,
affecting some members but not to all. They obviously cannot provide insurance to deal
with shocks common to all members. Self-insurance can, in principle, deal with any
type of shock, as long as ex ante sufficiently large resources have been built up.
Formal credit and insurance markets appear to contribute only little to reducing income
risk and its consequences. Informal credit and insurance, however incomplete, helps to
cope with risky incomes. These high risks are not easily insured via formal market
mechanisms. Credit and insurance markets are typically absent or incomplete for good
theoretical reasons or linked to bad policy (for surveys, see Bell 1988 or Besley 1994,
1995). Consumption loans are rare. Nevertheless, traditional credit systems (Roscas,
Susu, Tontines) often include a lending possibility, which may be used for consumption
purposes. Formal loans or loans in microfinance programmes also often serve
consumption purposes via their fungibility. Informal credit markets also appears to
adjust to high-risk environments. Udry (1994) reports that informal loans in rural
Nigeria appear to take the form of state contingent loans. Repayment is conditional on
income outcomes of both borrowers and lenders: negative shocks are translated into
more favourable terms for the agent experiencing them.
Despite these strategies, vulnerability to consumption shortfalls remains high. It is
therefore clear that further development of safety nets will be necessary. Townsend
(1995) noted that income variability remains high in the ICRISAT data for India:
‘diversification and other income strategies are only used to a limited extent and in any
case insufficient’. Risk coping strategies are also typically insufficient. Work on India
estimates that transfers amount to less than 10 per cent of the typical income shocks
(Rosenzweig 1988). Other studies also suggested imperfect risk-sharing or consumption
smoothing (Paxson 1993, Chaudhuri and Paxson 1994, Deaton 1992, 1991, Morduch
2001, see also Deaton 1997 for several examples).
The experiences during the large famines in the Horn in the mid-1980s also illustrated
the limitations of these coping strategies. Rahmato (1991) has documented in detail the
complexity of these strategies, but the results were still dramatic. Dercon (2001b)
reports that, in a sample of rural households, 10 years after the famine, cattle holdings
were still only two-thirds of what they were just before the famine of the mid-1980s.
Reardon et al. (1988) report that transfers in the aftermath of the 1984 drought were
only equivalent to three per cent of the losses for the poorest households in the Sahel.
Recent events in East Asia during the recent crisis also exposed the limitations of
informal insurance and self-insurance. In Indonesia, for example, consumption poverty
increased substantially, but even more important were the reductions in household
investment in health and education, affecting future generations (see Thomas et al.
2001, Frankenberg 1999, Chaudhuri et al. 2001).
More generally, the failure to cope with income risk is not only reflected in household
consumption. Effects on nutrition, health and education are also observed, as are intra-
household consequences. Rose (1999) finds that in rural India negative rainfall shocks
are associated with higher boy and girl mortality rates in landless households, but not in
have adapted their livelihood to serve their own objectives as good as possible – and whether this
includes more or less ‘traditional’ coping strategies is conceptually irrelevant, although as will be
seen, it has analytical and policy implications, e.g. regarding long-term incomes.6
households with lots of land. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that in South India
(ICRISAT-villages) children are often taken out of school in response to adverse income
shocks; the result is lower accumulation of human capital. Foster (1995) shows that
child growth was affected during and after the severe floods in Bangladesh in 1988. He
does not find evidence of a sex bias. But other studies find such a bias. Using ICRISAT-
data, Behrman (1988) shows that the inability to smooth consumption implies that child
health suffers in the period before the major harvest; girls are most affected. Behrman
and Deolalikar (1990), using data on individual nutrient intakes from India, report that
estimated price and wage elasticities of intakes are substantially and significantly higher
for females than for males, suggesting that women and girls share a disproportionate
burden of rising food prices.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000b) test risk-sharing within rural households in Ethiopia.
Adult nutrition is used to investigate whether individuals are able to smooth their
consumption and within the household over the seasons. Within poor households in the
southern part of the country, households do not engage in complete risk-sharing
between husbands and wives; women in these households bear the brunt of adverse
shocks. An average loss of labour due to illness for a female in a poor, southern
Ethiopian household results in a loss of 1.6 to 2.3 per cent of body weight due to the
lack of risk-sharing.
2 Asset strategies
Deaton (1991) sets out the benefits of self-insurance via savings when credit markets
are imperfect. In his model, the household maximises intertemporal expected utility.
Instantaneous utility is concave and the individual has a precautionary. It can save,
receiving a safe return on assets, which is assumed to be relatively low. Income is
risky.3 Households are impatient, so that they have a preference to consume today rather
than in the future. The result is that interest rates are lower than the rate of time
preference. Deaton shows that if households are infinitely lived (a ‘dynasty’) then
households will build up assets in good years to deplete in bad years. Assets will not be
systematically accumulated to very large levels due to impatience. We observe high
frequency fluctuations in savings, consumption smoother than income, even though it is
still possible that, after bad luck in the form of sequence of bad draws, consumption is
very low, i.e. a deep crisis is not easily insured. Deaton plausibly argues that for many
developing countries, this model fits well with some of the stylised facts of occasional
low consumption, low asset holdings and high frequency of asset transactions.
However, it is not easy to draw immediate policy conclusions from this work, except for
developing credit and insurance markets, which, as is well known, face inherent
problems not easily addressed by interventions (Besley 1994). In a way, the key result –
imperfectly smooth consumption – follows largely from the impatience of households:
if only they were patient, they would build up sufficient assets to cope with future
stress.
3 In the basic model income is also independently, identically distributed, but this assumption is relaxed
in further simulations.7
To understand household savings behaviour in risky developing countries environments,
one needs to acknowledge that assets are risky, not safe. Deaton’s model assumes that
savings can occur in a safe form with a positive rate of return. In practice, this may not
be possible. The lack of integration of asset markets and difficulties that face the poor in
obtaining access to the better (internationally traded) assets and securities means that the
portfolio of assets available to the poor is far from ideal. When a common negative
shock occurs, incomes are low and returns to different assets are also low – often even
negative. As a consequence, just when assets are needed, net stocks could be low as
well. For example, if assets are kept in the form of livestock (as they are commonly
throughout most of the developing world!), then during a drought not just are crop
incomes low, but some livestock may die and fertility will be low. The consequence is a
smaller herd or even loss of all livestock, just when needed as part of the self-insurance
scheme.4 Similarly, stock market returns may be low when crisis hits an economy – as
the experience in Asia during the recent crisis has shown. To the extent that some of
these stocks are kept for precautionary motives, similar effects occur.
The likely covariance of asset values and income due to common shocks makes self-
insurance a far less useful strategy than it seems. Another form of risk related to assets
is not so much related to the return per se, but to the terms of trade of assets relative to
consumption. If a negative common shock occurs, households would like to sell some
of their assets. However, if everybody wants to sell their assets, asset prices will
collapse and the consumption that can be purchased with the sale of assets will be
lower. Similarly, when a positive shock occurs, all will want to buy assets for future
protection, but then prices will be pushed up. In all, self-insurance becomes far more
expensive as a strategy.
There is a lot of evidence, albeit some of it anecdotal, that this is indeed common
occurrence. During the famine in Ethiopia in 1984–85, terms of trade between livestock
and food collapsed – relative food prices became three times higher than usual, reducing
the purchasing power of assets by two-thirds. In recent times, house prices in Indonesia
and other Asian economies have collapsed after a boom during the early 1990s. Note
that the same occurs following positive shocks. Bevan et al. (1991) reported on the
construction boom taking place during the coffee boom in the mid-1970s in Kenya:
prices for construction materials and other durables increased considerably. Households
tried to put some of their positive windfalls into more assets, but their choice set was
strongly restricted due to the macroeconomic policies.
Access to relatively safe and profitable assets, which might be useful for consumption
smoothing, may also be limited. Lumpiness in assets may be a reason why the poor
cannot protect themselves easily via assets. While risk in returns and terms of trade may
limit in certain circumstances the use of assets to smooth consumption, there are
examples where assets contribute to consumption smoothing. Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1993) have shown that bullock sales contribute to consumption smoothing in the South
Indian ICRISAT villages, although Lim and Townsend (1994) argue that crop inventory
appears to be the main strategy. Access to assets for smoothing may however not be
self-evident. For example, buying and selling cattle is generally recognised as a
4 Note that this type of risk in returns to assets are not limited to commodity-based assets. The risk of
bank bankcruptcy and a run to withdraw deposits during economic crisis means that seemingly safe
assets are in fact also risky with covariate returns with incomes.8
common strategy to cope with income fluctuations in many rural areas (Binswanger and
McIntire 1987, Davies 1996). However, a relatively large proportion of households
often do not own any. Dercon (1998) finds that only half the households in a sample in
Western Tanzania own cattle, even though cattle are important in the farming system
and in their culture. The explanation is not that the others simply choose to enter into
other activities; rather, investing into livestock requires a sizeable surplus: livestock are
lumpy. A cow, for example, costs about a fifth of mean crop income. Cattle ownership
is generally determined by endowments in male labour and land, suggesting that those
with a poorer endowment cannot generate sufficient means to enter into cattle rearing,
leaving them relatively more exposed to income risk.
The consequences of risky or lumpy assets are easily illustrated via simulations. Box 1,
based on Dercon (2000), gives some results. Risk in asset returns, terms of trade risk
and lumpiness have substantial impacts. The largest effects stem not from risk per se,
but from the covariance between asset values and income. Positive covariance is not
unrealistic: when an economy-wide shock occurs incomes are likely to decline but so
also will asset values. This results in a large reduction in the opportunity to effectively
self-insure.
Box 1
Simulations of the consequences of income and asset risk
In Dercon (2000), simulations are reported to illustrate the consequences of asset risk and
lumpiness in assets for the usefulness of savings to buffer consumption. Assuming some
reasonable values for the parameters of an extension of model similar to Deaton (1991),
the paper calculated the risk premium (what one would be willing to pay in the first period
to avoid risk) using different assumptions about assets. In particular, a 20-year horizon
was assumed, as well as logarithmic utility, risky income with mean 50 and a standard
deviation of 10, a rate of time preference and an expected interest rate of 5 per cent.
Without access to credit, insurance or savings, the risk premium was 19.8 per cent of
mean income. This can be seen as the benchmark – a measure of the risk that needs to
be covered. Expressing the risk premium in each case as a percentage of total risk
provides a measure of how much risk remains uninsured; one minus this value is a
measure of how well self-insurance works. With safe assets, this was 67 per cent: or two-
thirds of the total consumption risk is insured if households have access to safe assets and
use them optimally. Asset returns risk (introduced as returns with mean 5 per cent and a
coefficient of variation of 0.2) reduces this marginally to 65 per cent. However, if the
correlation of incomes and assets in 0.5 – covariate risk – then this drops to 58 per cent.
Covariance in terms of trade is far more problematic. If asset prices are risky (coefficient of
variation of 0.2), then with price risk independent of income risk, self-insurance can only
cover 50 per cent of the total risk premium. However, positive covariance (with a
correlation coefficient of 0.5) reduces this to 16 per cent. Furthermore, introducing
lumpiness in the assets – so that they need to be bought in units of 10 – reduced this
further to only 5 per cent. In short, terms of trade risk, especially if it is covariate with
income, and lumpiness rapidly reduce the usefulness of self-insurance via savings.9
There is some evidence of household behaviour consistent with these predictions.
During the 1984–85 famine, households in Ethiopia were observed rather to cut their
consumption to dangerously low levels rather than sell their assets, when asset terms of
trade had totally collapsed. This is consistent with the model described above: the return
in terms of consumption of keeping on to their assets is very high, since at present very
little consumption can be obtained. Czukas et al. (1998) present evidence consistent
with this model. They find that livestock sales (both cattle and small stock) combined
offset at most 30 per cent, and probably closer to only 15 per cent of the crop income
shortfall endured during severe drought.
Policies that influence asset market risks could be beneficial to households attempting to
deal with shocks. Policies could include providing more attractive and diversified
savings instruments. Microfinance initiatives should put savings for self-insurance on
the agenda. Macroeconomic stability during income downturns would also allow self-
insurance to function better. Providing households access to better, a larger set and less
risky assets should avoid some of these problems. Integrating asset markets with the
wider economy could avoid much of the often-observed covariate movements in asset
prices and incomes. For example, if in rural Africa or India, holding other assets, such
as low cost financial savings via post-office accounts etc. could be facilitated, then
communities could use alternatives to animals to store wealth. Introducing a focus on
savings for self-insurance in the booming number of initiatives related to microfinance
operations could be of help.
The terms of trade risk between assets and consumption is of particular concern. This
has partly to do with macroeconomic stability. For example, terms of trade declines
often coincide with consumer price increases relative to asset prices (e.g. in the famines
in Bangladesh in 1974, in Ethiopia in 1985). Low inflation and exchange rate stability
could reduce these large shocks in relative prices when incomes are low. Policies that
limit the macroeconomic impact of common shocks would enhance self-insurance.
3 Income smoothing strategies
In this section, I consider income smoothing, i.e. strategies which reduce the risk in the
income process. Often, the strategy considered is diversification of income sources.
Theoretically, as long as the different income sources are not perfectly covariate (i.e.
they have a correlation coefficient below 1), then there will be a reduction in total
income risk from combining two income sources with the same mean and variance.
Stated like this, there appear to be no costs involved: mean income is the same. It is
therefore useful to consider also another income-based strategy, in which mean income
is reduced to obtain lower risk. One could refer to this as income-skewing: resources are
allocated towards low risk-low return activities. In the extreme, this will not show up as
diversification: the poor may well be more specialised in a low risk-low return activity.
In this section I will discuss how effective income smoothing is, and the determinants
and costs of diversification and income skewing.
Widespread diversification of income sources is commonly observed in developing
countries. However, in practice relatively little income smoothing is achieved by poorer
households via this route. Many studies have emphasised the extent to which
households diversify income sources. Across the developing world, farm households
achieve a substantial share of income from non-farm activities. Reardon et al. (1994)10
report an average share of 39 per cent in across eight countries in rural West Africa.
Besides non-agricultural activities, households fragment their land holdings into many
plots, grow different crops or engage in local farm wage employment. But is
diversification effective in practice? Townsend (1995) suggests that in the ICRISAT
villages in India, substantial scope for diversification exists, but in practice relatively
little takes place. Or at least, income remains highly variable.
Why does diversification not always result in income smoothing? First, it should be
emphasised that, contrary to the impression created, combining different income sources
is not always meant to handle risk. For example, different activities may be conducted at
different times (e.g. seasonal activities), providing income across the year by serving to
smooth labour over time. Second, while in ‘normal’ years farm and off-farm activities
may be relatively uncorrelated during crises, they may move together. Since downturns
could be severe, this would severely limit the use of diversification. There is evidence
that this is the case. Czukas et al. (1998) find evidence that non-farm income is
positively correlated with shocks affecting crop income: drought adversely affects not
only crop income but also non-farm income. They refer to Sen’s analysis of famine –
crop failure leads to a collapse of the demand for local services and crafts, limiting the
use of diversification to handle risk.
There are also important constraints on entering into profitable and risk-reducing
diversification. Non-agricultural activities or profitable alternative agricultural activities
are not accessed easily. Most effectively-risk-reducing activities with a reasonable
return cannot be easily entered. Entry constraints could take the form of working capital
needs, skills requirements etc. (e.g. Reardon et al. 1988, Reardon 1997). Dercon and
Krishnan (1996) look explicitly at the role of different constraints to enter into activities
in Tanzania and Ethiopia. They find that the poor typically enter into activities with low
entry costs: firewood collection, charcoal, collecting dung cakes, casual agricultural
wage employment, etc. Entry into high return non-crop activities, such as cattle rearing
or shop keeping, is restricted to richer households, presumably with access to capital.
Non-agricultural wage employment is restricted to those with education. When asked,
most households would like to invest into cattle rearing and to a lesser extent, trade and
business. More recent data from Ethiopia on non-farm business activities and the
investments typically needed to enter into these affected seems to confirm the relatively
high capital needs for some activities. While some activities require virtually no
investment, others where quite costly. Median investment into charcoal making,
dungcakes collection, handicrafts, weaving or food processing was between
0 and 20 birr (US$ 3), but the returns to these activities are relatively low. More
lucrative activities, such starting a shop, entering into livestock trade or transport
services required 300 to 550 birr (about US$ 45 to 80). A mature cow costs about 400
birr (US$ 60). These are large sums in an economy with mean per adult income below
US$ 200 (own calculation from data from Ethiopian Rural Household Survey 1995).
Dercon (1998) looked further at the evidence on whether activity choice towards high
return activities in rural Tanzania is affected by entry constraints or by comparative
advantage, and finds the former far more relevant. Risk considerations matter as well,
but only forcing the poorer households to enter into low return activities. This leads us
to the next point.
Income risk reduction often comes at a cost. The long-term consequences for the asset-
poor are lower average incomes and a higher income gap relative to asset-rich
households. Profitable or mean income preserving diversification is therefore not easily11
possible. Collier and Gunning (1999), building on the evidence discussed above,
suggest that the poor have to enter into low return-capital extensive activities, since high
return activities require capital. The poor are less diversified despite facing more serious
consequences of bad income draws with limited insurance and credit market
imperfections. The implication is that many diversification or income skewing strategies
are actually mean income reducing, making them less interesting for households: lower
risk will have to be weighed against low returns, providing another reason for the
limited income smoothing achieved in practice.
Another implication is that income-based strategies are directly linked to asset-based
strategies (and other forms of protections offered, such as by informal insurance). As
analysed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989), credit can serve as insurance substitute but
credit market imperfections usually imply collateralised lending. The consequence is
that asset-poor households cannot enter into high-risk activities, since downside risks
are too high, while asset rich households do not face this problem. Those with access to
(liquid) assets can borrow in times of crisis, or if credit is absent sell them as part of a
buffer stock strategy. To handle income risk, asset-poor households will have to enter
low-risk, low-return activities. The consequence is further impoverishment, or at least
increased inequality.
There is evidence that this indeed is happening. Morduch (1990), using the ICRISAT
sample, shows that asset-poor households devote a larger share of land to safer
traditional varieties of rice and castor than to riskier but high-return varieties.5 Dercon
(1996) finds that households with limited liquid asset (livestock) grow proportionately
more sweet potatoes, a low-return, low risk crop in an area in Tanzania. A household
with an average livestock holding has a proportion of land allocated to sweet potatoes
which is 20 per cent smaller than for a household with no liquid assets. The return per
adult is 25 per cent higher for the crop portfolio of the wealthiest group compared to the
poorest quintile. Choosing a less risky crop portfolio has substantial consequences for
incomes.
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) suggests that the portfolio of activities (and
investments) in the ICRISAT villages in India is affected by high risk. Increasing the
coefficient of variation of rainfall timing by one standard deviation would reduce farm
profits for the poorest quartile by 35 per cent; for the richest quartile the effect is
negligible. Efficiency is affected and average incomes of the poor are reduced.
Wealthier farmers are not affected and achieve therefore higher incomes. The long-term
wealth distribution is affected: 54 per cent of wealth is held by the top 20 per cent of
households. Jalan and Ravallion (1998) have other examples, although their evidence is
more mixed.
Note that these results do not follow from differences in risk preferences. Controlling
for preferences, the poor select a low risk-low return portfolio, while the rich take on a
more risky set of activities. The results are related to the constraints on the options
available to households. Kochar (1995) states, for example, in the Indian ICRISAT-
villages ‘the set of options faced by farmers offers little role for preferences’ (p.159).
5 Note that he finds a significant effect on plot diversification but not on a crop diversification index,
which may well be linked with some of the points made above.12
Finally, several income-based strategies are only invoked when a crisis looms. These
(income) ‘coping’ or ‘survival’ strategies are especially important when the shock is
economy-wide. When a large negative occurs, the usual household activities may not
yield sufficient income. If all households in a community or region are affected, local
income earning activities are unlikely to be sufficient. Examples of these crises are
droughts and floods, but also large economic shocks, such as those which affected parts
of Asia in recent years.
Kochar (1995) argues that labour supply adjustments, rather than asset or other
strategies, are the main strategy used by households in India to cope with negative
idiosyncratic shocks. Increased labour force participation in response to economic
shocks is also found elsewhere. Moser (1998) reports increased female labour market
participation and child labour in communities in Ecuador and Zambia (p.8). Jacoby and
Skoufias (1997) find that in the Indian ICRISAT villages, children are taken out of school
in response to adverse income shocks to work, resulting in low human capital
accumulation. Both female labour adjustment and withdrawal of children from schools
were found to feature in the strategies used by households in Indonesia to limit the
impact of the recent crisis (Thomas et al. 2001, Frankenberg 1999). During a deep
crisis, such as during a famine, additional action is often taken to prevent destitution.
Rahmato (1991), Corbett (1988), Davies (1996), De Waal (1987) report many
examples, including temporary migration for jobs, longer working days, collecting wild
foods, collecting forest products for sale such as firewood, etc.
To conclude, diversifying income sources is useful but for the poor it may come at a
high cost. Observing specialisation does not necessarily imply that the household
follows a high-risk strategy. Also, entry constraints may limit the diversification that
can be achieved, leaving only low return activities free to the poor. Income portfolios
must be seen in relation to the asset portfolio and other options available: a risky,
specialised portfolio may mean lower consumption risk than a diversified portfolio,
depending on the asset position. The policy implication is that ‘just’ promoting
diversification is not necessarily a solution – finding ways of reducing entry constraints
into profitable low risk activities is crucial.
4 Informal risk-sharing and safety nets
Beyond income-based strategies and self-insurance, households use a variety of
informal risk-sharing arrangements to cope with the consequences of risk. Typically,
they involve a system of mutual assistance between family networks or communities.
There has been increasing interest in the empirical analysis of informal risk-sharing and
theoretical modelling on the sustainability and consequences of these arrangements (see
Morduch 1999 for a more detailed review). Central questions addressed in the empirical
literature have been whether there is any evidence of complete risk-sharing both in
communities in developing country as in a wide variety of settings, including the US
and how (partial or complete) risk-sharing is obtained. The tests have generally found
that complete risk-sharing has to be rejected, including in the US, in communities in
India, in extended families in the PSID or even within nuclear households in Ethiopia
(Townsend 1994, Hayashi et al. 1996, Dercon and Krishnan 2000b). Nevertheless, the
evidence is consistent with partial risk-sharing.13
These studies tend to test the presence of outcomes similar to those obtained by risk-
sharing, although the tests cannot distinguish results due to self-insurance (i.e.
accumulating and depleting assets) and informal insurance (or insurance-like behaviour,
via transfers or credit). Nevertheless, there is evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfer
behaviour in different countries or state-contingent (‘quasi’)-credit. Udry (1994) present
evidence on state-contingent loans in northern Nigeria. Lund and Fafchamps (2000)
show that loans and transfers within networks play an important role in risk-sharing.
Grimard (1997) ordered the LSMS Côte d’Ivoire data by tribe and appears to find more
stable consumption by tribes than for the full data set, suggesting that tribal networks
allow smoothing over space, including via transfers. Full risk-sharing is rejected,
however.
More direct evidence on the extent of risk-sharing also shows its limitations. Using
detailed data on Northern Ghana, Goldstein et al. (2001) have shown that many
idiosyncratic shock are not insured via community contacts or even spouses. De Weerdt
(2001) uses a detailed survey of all networks in a village in Tanzania that poorer
households have fewer contacts to turn to in times of need, and typically poorer
households can only rely on other poor households, not rich ones.
These limitations of risk-sharing arrangements are also mirrored in theoretical work.
Hoff (1996), for example, has highlighted the possible negative consequences of
informal risk sharing on poverty. Fafchamps (2001) discusses the persistence of
inequality and patronage linked to risk-sharing arrangements. Another part of the theory
literature has been on the nature and sustainability of (partial or complete) risk-sharing
arrangements given the lack of formal enforcement (Coate and Ravallion 1993, Platteau
1997, Ligon et al. 2001, Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000). Ligon et al. (2001) show
evidence that the constrained risk-sharing model fits the ICRISAT- d a t af o rI n d i ab e t t e r .
Still, even if imperfect, for many poor households in developing countries these are
crucial networks helping them to cope with misfortune. Such groups can only insure
idiosyncratic shocks, not common shocks. It would then be tempting to suggest that
other means should be used to insure common shocks – savings or public safety nets
should be developed to cope with these risks, as well as encouraging more protection
against idiosyncratic shocks, not covered by communities. However, the consequences
of these alternatives should be well understood.
Much attention has been paid in the public transfer literature to the problems of
crowding out: the impact of public transfers for the poor is typically smaller than the
total transfer, since net private transfers to the poor are reduced (for a discussion, see
Cox and Jimenez 1992). Crowding-out of informal arrangements is also possible when
public safety nets are introduced. Given the imperfection of informal arrangements
alluded above and if the safety net provides full protection to all vulnerable households
and individuals, this is hardly a serious problem from a welfare point of view (even if
the cost may be high). However, the problem is more complicated in the case of self-
sustaining informal arrangements where enforcement is not self-evident, and if safety
nets provide targeted support.
The problem of sustainability involves that certain households may have incentives to
leave the arrangement if they feel that staying in the arrangement – supporting others
when the going is good to receive support when the going is bad – may not be in their
interest. For example, if individuals have a series of lucky income draws then they may14
rather keep this money and invest to better themselves than use it to support others.
Also, if some households in the network have access to a new source of risk reduction
or protection, then the arrangement may come under pressure. Sometimes renegotiating
the reciprocal arrangement may allow the arrangement to continue, albeit on other
terms; alternatively, the arrangement may break down (Platteau 1997, Ligon et al.
2001).
Public safety nets involve such a change of circumstances that may have undesired
welfare effects. Information, budget or other constraints often result in the exclusion of
some ‘needy’ households, even if targeting methods, including self-targeting are being
used. This may result in specific type of crowding-out. Some households covered by the
safety net may have incentives to leave their informal risk sharing arrangements,
leaving other households less protected. Note that this implies negative externalities
from the safety net: some households are more vulnerable due to the introduction of a
safety net for others.6 Finally, this problem is not just limited to public safety nets: any
policy intervention that improves an individual’s position outside a private group-based
informal risk-sharing arrangement may provide incentives to break down the informal
arrangement (Ligon 2001, Dercon and Krishnan 2001). This concern is largely an
empirical issue. Some have suggested that this form of crowding out is large (e.g.
Albarran and Attanasio 2001). The most important point at this stage is, however, to
acknowledge that one cannot take for granted that informal schemes dealing with
idiosyncratic risk will not be affected by other interventions, including better
functioning safety nets for common shocks or support for more self-insurance activities.
To avoid these problems, schemes that target groups rather than individuals, e.g.
employment schemes for the group or the whole community involved in an informal
scheme may be more appropriate. This of course requires detailed information about the
informal schemes operating. An alternative could be to encourage and support groups
involved in informal insurance arrangements to develop group-based self-insurance
mechanisms. Indeed, the standard distinction that individual-based self-insurance can
deal best with common shocks, while informal arrangements are suitable for
idiosyncratic shocks, is misleading. Groups have incentives to self-insure as well,
especially if there are economies of scale in asset holdings (e.g. transactions costs,
opportunities for risk-pooling of assets, etc.). Groups could build up assets in good years
to deplete in bad years, for the benefit of its members by using transfer rules and
mechanisms parallel to the risk-sharing arrangement for idiosyncratic shocks.7 Policy
interventions could provide incentives for this type of behaviour. Better savings
instruments, access to banking, but also macroeconomic stability would assist this
process. One could also endeavour to include a more important savings-for-insurance
6 In fact, this may even happen if everybody is covered by the safety net. Attanasio and Rios-Rull
(2000) analyse this case and consider the consequences of introducing a safety net to deal with
common shocks. Since the insurance of some part of the total risk faced by households improves the
households’ autarky position, it is possible that more than one-to-one crowding out occurs and total
welfare is reduced by the safety net. Note that self-targeted schemes may not necessarily solve the
problem: they also affect the individuals’ outside option. Of course, the lower the payments in the
scheme, the less they will affect the enforceability constraints. This is simply equivalent to providing
lower insurance.
7 Indeed, in some traditional societies, this type of group behaviour was common. An example could be
found in Western Tanzania (Sukumaland), where a community food stock, run by the village head,
provided protection for the village when a large-scale crisis occurred.15
element in group-based credit programmes, a current favourite in donor interventions.
Note nevertheless that group-based targeting and insurance schemes have their own
problems (Conning and Kevane 2001, 2002).
5 Monitoring income risk, vulnerability and coping strategies
The presence of serious income risk and its limited success to smooth shocks has
implications for poverty measurement. Income as a measure of welfare to identify
poverty has long been recognised to be problematic. As an alternative, current
consumption, as found in cross-section surveys, has been used for most quantitative
poverty analysis. The argument is that consumption is smoother than income and due to
concavity of utility (risk-aversion), households have strong incentives to keep
consumption smooth. However, the combination of high income risk and the observed
inability of households to keep consumption smooth via risk-management or coping
strategies, especially when a serious shock hits them, would suggest that alternative
measures are needed.8
If inter-temporal data are available, dynamic poverty definitions can be used. For
example, if data are available on consumption over time, it is possible to take into
account that some households may only be poor in some years due to risk.9 One could
distinguish those that are poor in each period from those that are poor in only some of
the periods sampled. In all panel data sets on developing countries currently available,
the large consumption fluctuations in the data result in a large number of the households
moving in and out of poverty. For example, in the Indian ICRISAT data set, about 25 per
cent of the poor in each period move out of poverty in the next period. Gaiha and
Deolalikar (1993) reported that only 12 per cent of households were never poor. Jalan
and Ravallion (2000) reported that about half the poor in each year were not poor on
average in their sample form Rural China. Using data from rural Ethiopia, Dercon and
Krishnan (2000a) report that while poverty remains largely the same on average
between 1994 and 1995 at about 40 per cent, about a third of the poor are different
households in each year. More evidence can be found in Baulch and Hoddinott (2000)
and other articles in this special issue of Journal of Development Studies.
One needs to be cautious when interpreting the evidence on widespread poverty
transitions and fluctuations. Measurement error in the data would show up as increased
movement above and below the poverty line, increasing the apparent mobility. Still,
since most studies quoted above can find variables correlated with the fluctuations,
which are unlikely to be correlated with measurement error in consumption, it is likely
that a substantial part of the observed consumption fluctuations are genuine.
8 Note that this is not just a problem for consumption poverty but also for other non-monetary
dimensions of poverty. Alternative welfare measures, such as nutrition, food expenditure, expenditure
on specific commodities (such as health or education), and even measures such as health or enrolment
into schools would suffer from the same problem. For evidence on the impact of risk on education and
nutrition, see Jalan and Ravallion (1998), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Dercon and Krishnan (2000b),
Foster (1995).
9 Note that risk does not need to be only reason for poverty fluctuations: if credit and asset markets are
imperfect, even predictable fluctuations in income may cause consumption and poverty fluctuations.
An example is seasonality.16
Ravallion (1988) has proposed a means to capture the distinction between chronic and
transient (including risk-related) poverty. Using consumption as the underlying welfare
measure, the chronically poor are those with average consumption below the poverty
line. Transient poverty for an individual is the average poverty over time of this
individual minus chronic poverty. Additive poverty measures can then be decomposed
into a transient and chronic part. For example, using the squared poverty gap, Jalan and
Ravallion (2000) report that roughly half of total (inter-temporally aggregate) poverty in
their Chinese rural panel data set covering 1985–90 is contributed by transient poverty.
They find that transient poverty is highest for those with average consumption near the
poverty line and about 40 per cent of transient poverty is found among those not poor on
average. But almost all transient poverty is for households whose mean consumption is
no more than 50 per cent above the poverty line. This evidence implies that in any given
year, the measured poverty level will exclude some that are at risk to be poor in the near
future.10 Some of the non-poor tend to have relatively high average consumption over
time (but within bounds).
Dercon and Krishnan (2000a) look explicitly at the link between shocks and poverty
transitions, using panel data from Ethiopia. They use a fixed-effects model of
consumption in which changes in consumption are linked to idiosyncratic and common
shocks, such as rainfall shocks, a series of other crop shocks, illness shocks, shocks to
livestock, etc. They find some of the fluctuations appear to be seasonal responses to
prices and labour requirements. Nevertheless, shocks matter. Most areas in the sample
experienced a fairly good harvest in the sample period. In the best period of the year
(the post-harvest period) they find actual poverty of about 33 per cent; in the worst
period about 40 per cent. Using the model and the shock information, they find however
that depending on how good the year is, poverty in the post-harvest period could be up
to 60 per cent in the worst period. In other words, given current coping opportunities, a
large percentage of the population would be poor in a bad year, substantially larger than
current poverty estimates from the (relatively good) 1990s would suggest.
Measures of vulnerability to poverty, as distinct from current poverty, are being
developed. Work on poverty dynamics, including on transient poverty has highlighted
the limitations of current static poverty measures. However, these alternative
approaches remain backward-looking: they describe the past consequences of shocks
and fluctuations. While information on the characteristics of those experiencing poverty
transitions may assist in identifying those most at risk for consumption shortfalls, this is
not quite the same as measuring vulnerability to poverty. Such a measure should be ex
ante, i.e. forward-looking. One could define ‘vulnerable households’ as those liable to
fall under an agreed poverty line over time with a particular high probability (for
example more than 50 per cent or more than the current poverty rate).11 Measures are
proposed in Christiaensen and Boisvert (2000), Chaudhuri et al. (2001), Pritchett et al.
(2000), Alwang, et al. (2001). More in general, beyond a headcount of vulnerability,
one could construct measures of vulnerability for different dimensions of poverty (such
10 Or, to put it more correctly, given that Jalan and Ravallion (2000) use the squared poverty gap (P2),
the non-poor in any given year will contribute to poverty in other years.
11 This means that some non-poor may well be classified as vulnerable, and some currently poor may not
be vulnerable to future poverty.17
as health or nutrition); or measures taking into account the extent to which households
are likely to fall below the poverty line (Kamanou and Morduch 2001).
Targeting assistance to vulnerable populations requires specific kinds of information.
Vulnerability measures and profiles based on these measures could be helpful for better
policy design. Some have proposed measures purely based on cross-section household
data (Chaudhuri et al. 2001), but the assumptions needed to identify common and
idiosyncratic risk are very strong. Panel data have the advantage that recent shocks and
responses to risk can be modelled, while households less able to cope with risk can be
identified. This can form the basis for measuring and analysing vulnerability. (Dercon
and Krishnan 2000a, Amin et al. 1999, Kamanou and Morduch 2001). The quantitative
analysis of the success and failings of existing risk-reducing strategies by household is
highly data-intensive, requiring detailed panel data. Most analysis published in the
economics literature on risk and its consequences in developing countries is based on a
handful of data sets, with most stylised facts entering into textbook development
economics based on the three villages in South India, covered by ICRISAT. It is not
realistic to expect this detail for a large number of countries in the developing world.
While more work is no doubt needed on detailed panel data sets, household surveys,
including cross-sections, could be used to derive some measures and insights about
vulnerability and the strategies used by households. In particular, most panel data
studies find that vulnerability to shocks is closely linked to assets in the form of human
and physical capital. In many ways, these are similar factors as typically highlighted as
determining long-term poverty, although analysis has suggested that the extent to which
they matter is usually different. Households with limited land holdings, with few assets
that can be liquidated and with limited education typically are most affected by the
consequences of income risk. This is reflected in a lower mean level of consumption
(due to consumption risk averting actions, such as income skewing) or higher
consumption fluctuations. Most cross-section household surveys contain information on
physical and human capital, although in recent years, some of the instruments promoted
for monitoring welfare changes appear to have been cutting back on these measures.
The total value of assets alone may not provide sufficient information on the ability to
use self-insurance. Important questions also relate to the liquidity of assets – can they be
sold if needed? Furthermore, they may lose their value during a crisis due to covariate
risk, as the discussion in Section 2 has shown. Consequently, current asset values may
not provide a good indicator for the effectiveness of the asset to buffer consumption. At
least, information is needed on the functioning of asset and food markets as well.
Information on physical and human capital may not be enough for another reason. In the
discussion in Section 3, it was argued that households may face constraints to enter into
profitable diversification. Existing research suggests that physical and human capital are
crucial determinants for entry into these activities. However, at the same time
opportunities must exist to exploit these activities. Well-functioning markets, helped by
infrastructure, roads and a demand for these products are just as important; general
economic policies matter as well. It may well be possible that physical capital or skills
are available, for example, to enter into handicrafts or trade, as part of a coping strategy,18
but some areas may just be too remote to enter into them profitably. In short,
information on opportunities available is just as important.12
Note that entry constraints and incentives to skew income towards low-risk activities
imply that indexes measuring the degree of diversification (e.g. the number of activities,
the share of off-farm income, etc.) are unlikely to be a good measure of vulnerability.
For example, there is also no reason why a household specialised in a low risk activity
faces higher risk than a household having a diversified portfolio of two very risky,
correlated activities. Furthermore, it is important to look at the income portfolio in
conjunction with the other risk-coping strategies: assets for self-insurance and informal
insurance. Indeed, one important lesson from the literature surveyed is that the degree of
diversification will be endogenous to the other strategies used, including self-insurance,
irrespective of constraints on diversification.
In short, data on physical and human capital, combined with information on the
functioning of and opportunities in product, labour and asset markets could provide a
good basis to identify vulnerable households. Standard household surveys, including
cross-section surveys, may contain a substantial part of the relevant information at the
household level.
Data collection on household involvement in informal insurance systems is also
necessary to analyse household vulnerability to poverty. The lack of such information is
an important shortcoming of most standard household surveys. Nevertheless,
understanding vulnerability and designing interventions to address these problems
require information on the networks households can fall back upon. It is possible to
include in household survey questions about the association of the household with
others, and whether any insurance element is included. Observed transfers and other
linkages may be one option; direct questioning on opportunities available to ask for help
in times of crisis is another (examples are in De Weerdt 2001, Dercon and Krishnan
2000a, Goldstein et al. 2001). A simple enumeration of the presence of networks may
be useful, but care has to be taken to interpret any linkage or network as a proof for the
existence of informal insurance mechanisms. Insurance and support networks definitely
form part of social capital, but all social capital cannot simply be reduced to have
insurance purposes.
Finally, a full description of the opportunities available to households to cope with
shocks requires also information on the available formal safety nets. Any formal safety
nets, for example, as part of a social security policy, is relevant and needs to be taken
into account for monitoring vulnerability or designing policy initiatives. The existence
of public employment schemes and the way they function need to be taken into account.
For example, not just the amounts of support offered is relevant, but also their
timeliness, targeting and overall impact on household vulnerability needs to be looked
at. The available evidence suggests that the impact may at times be more limited than
anticipated (Barrett et al. 2001, Dercon and Krishnan 2001).
12 A good example is the ‘traditional’ coping mechanisms with a localised drought in Ethiopia. During
the drought in Northern Ethiopia in 1984–85, households could not fall back on one of their typical
strategies, temporary migration to look for work, because there was a ban on casual wage labour
imposed by the government, while the war effort made anyone travelling suspect. The consequences
are well-known.19
The study of different forms of capital and the opportunities available to use them to
reduce consumption risk can be enhanced by relatively simple, but revealing evidence
on the experience of households during shocks, whether idiosyncratic or common. In
particular, it is useful to ask households shocks they have experienced in recent years
and how they handled these crises. This would include questions on the shocks they
suffered and its overall impact, whether they have adjusted their income generating
activities, how they have used their assets and whether they could rely on other people
to support them during the crisis. Similarly, one could investigate how households
would respond if particular shocks hit them now. While qualitative in nature, these
direct questions, combined with information on assets could provide rich information on
existing strategies to cope with risk and could inform appropriate policy design.
Examples are in Tables 1 and 2 above, or in Udry (1994), De Weerdt (2001), Goldstein
et al. (2001), Townsend (1995).
Economic reform programmes are not exogenous to the risk management and coping
strategies employed by households. They are bound to affect the opportunities and the
ability of households to cope with risk, and not necessarily just in a positive sense.
While more economic opportunities or better functioning asset and product markets are
likely to strengthen these strategies, they may also expose households to other risks, for
example, changing price risk or different risk in public service delivery. Such analysis is
rarely implemented even though it is important. Even newly introduced safety nets may
have such complicated impacts, for example, linked to imperfect targeting or crowding-
out type externalities on households not covered by the safety net, via the breakdown of
informal support networks (see Section 4). Optimal policy design would then require
not just information on those currently most at risk, but also use insights on the informal
links and insurance between the targeted group and other possibly vulnerable groups
dependent on informal arrangements. In general, if policies cannot be assumed to be
exogenous to household behaviour and networks, then more detailed analysis on the
shocks experienced by households and the way households cope with income risk
would be needed to inform policy. At present, very little analysis is available.
The emphasis on the ability to cope with risk via assets, human capital and informal
insurance and on the opportunities available marks a convergence of different
disciplines, bridging gaps with more qualitative approaches. The increasing emphasis on
monitoring different forms of capital (human, physical and social) and the opportunities
to use these capital goods when needed clearly draws inspiration from Sen’s
‘entitlements’ approach to the analysis of famine. Although I emphasise that household
surveys can derive much of the relevant information to monitor and understand
vulnerability to risk, similar approaches can be found in social-sciences literature using
qualitative approaches (Moser 1998 and the reference therein give examples). Similarly
to the approach taken in this paper, households are considered managers of complex
portfolios of assets and interventions should be aimed to promote better opportunities to
use these assets. This approach relies on more qualitative data collection techniques,
such participatory assessment.
Some may be tempted to suggest that quantitative surveys should not be used to study
vulnerability and risk-coping strategies, and leave qualitative studies fill the gap (as
appears to be case at present in welfare monitoring activities). I do not take this
position. Integrating qualitative data collection into quantitative household surveys is
bound to yield less contradictory evidence than presently seems to be found by the
different approaches, for example, on the effects on vulnerability and poverty from20
economic policies. National household surveys are likely to be required to obtain
information on the scale of vulnerability and its regional spread and diversity, and to
inform decisions about policies and priorities. The local nature of qualitative studies is
bound to add more detailed understanding of vulnerability, but the results are difficult to
aggregate and compare across areas.
6 Conclusions
Households in developing countries continue to face considerable risk, threatening their
livelihood. In this paper, I have discussed the different strategies households use to cope
with this risk. I have focused on income-based strategies, on assets as self-insurance and
on informal insurance arrangements. Households are constrained in using these
strategies. Income-based strategies are limited because of entry-constraints into
profitable activities, leaving the poor to concentrate on low return, low risk activities.
Self-insurance is limited by access to assets and poor functioning of asset markets when
a crisis hits the household. Informal insurance arrangements are affected by
sustainability constraints, often excluding the poor from these arrangements;
furthermore, economy-wide shocks cannot be handled by these arrangements.
Economic policies could contribute to better protection against risk. Improved working
of asset markets and macroeconomic stability would contribute to the usefulness of self-
insurance. Increased access to alternative economic activities and increased
opportunities could allow income-based strategies to be strengthened. Public safety nets
could be a useful alternative, although initiatives to develop safety nets should take into
account existing risk-coping strategies to understand their overall effects. Strengthening
self-insurance may remain an insufficiently explored alternative, such as via group-
based savings. More empirical research, however, is necessary to assess the functioning
of informal risk-sharing arrangements and the consequences of interventions thereupon.
Obtaining estimates on the vulnerable population rather than the currently poor is very
data intensive, most likely requiring panel data to ensure that they reflect genuine
vulnerability. Cross-section surveys could also provide useful insights. In particular,
they could provide information on the underlying determinants of the risk-reducing
strategies, in the form of physical, human and social capital. They also could inform
about the risk faced by households and the opportunities available to households,
currently and during past crises. Qualitative studies could provide useful insights but
incorporating some of these concerns in large quantitative household surveys is likely to
yield important pay-offs in terms of better understanding of changes in welfare and
vulnerability, and in terms of optimal policy design.21
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